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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH.
:
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
:

MICHAEL SHAKEEL PETERSON,

Case No. 20050322-CA

:

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Failure to
Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a third-degree felony in violation of
U.C.A. §41-6-13.51(1953) as amended, one count of Interference with an
Arresting Officer, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-8305(1953) as amended, one count of Driving on a Suspended License, a Class
C misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §53-3-227(l)(1953) as amended, and
one count of Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §41-646 (1953) as amended. The trial court sitting with a jury found the Defendant
guilty on all counts on January 26, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e).
1
2

Renumbered in 2005 as §41-6a-210
Renumbered in 2005 as § 41-6a-601

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Point I
WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF
FAILING TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A POLICE
OFFICER AND INTERFERING WITH A LEGAL
ARREST?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter of
law and fact whether the evidence at trial supported the defendant's conviction.
"When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal jury trial, we
begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation, which we decide as a
matter of law. With regard to the facts, 'we review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 355(Utah Ct. App.
1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1992)(citations
omitted).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: This issue was properly
preserved for appeal by the timely motion to dismiss made by defense counsel
at the close of the State's case. (R. 79 /110).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
§41-6-13.5. (Renumbered in 2005 as §41-6a-210.) Failure to respond to
officer's signal to stop ~ Fleeing —
2

(1) (a) An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not:
(i) operate the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to
interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or
(ii) attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means.
(b) (i) A person who violates Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.
§41-6-46 (Renumbered in 2005 as § 41-6a-601.) Speed regulations — Safe
and appropriate speeds at certain locations — Prima facie speed limits —
Emergency power of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing, including when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
(e) approaching other hazards that exist due to pedestrians, other traffic,
weather, or highway conditions.
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a603, the following speeds are lawful:
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section
41-6a-303;
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604, any speed in excess of the
limits provided in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 416a-603 is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and
that it is unlawful.
§53-3-227(l)Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while driving privilege
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — Penalties.
(1) A person whose driving privilege has been denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in
which the person's driving privilege was granted and who drives any motor
vehicle upon the highways of this state while that driving privilege is denied,
suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as provided in this
section.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a
3

violation specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
§76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
§77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence.
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged with four charges: Count 1, Failure to
Respond to an Officer's Signal to stop, a third degree felony; Count 2,
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B. misdemeanor; Count 3,
Driving on a Suspended or Revoked License, a class C misdemeanor; and
Count 4, Speeding, a class C misdemeanor. R. 001-02. A preliminary hearing
was scheduled for August 2, 2004. The Defendant waived his right to a
preliminary hearing and pled not guilty. R. 009-011. A jury found the
Defendant guilty of all charges on January 26, 2005. R. 53-54.

The

Defendant was sentenced on March 14, 2005, to serve a term of zero to five
4

years at the Utah State Prison on the felony charge and the maximum jail
sentence on the respective misdemeanors. R. 59-61. On April 7, 2005, the
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 65-66.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant was charged with four charges: Count 1, Failure to
Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; Count 2,
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B. misdemeanor; Count 3,
Driving on a Suspended or Revoked License, a class C misdemeanor; and
Count 4, Speeding, a class C misdemeanor. The defendant acknowledged to the
jury that he was guilty of speeding and driving on revocation (R. 79 / 59). The
parties stipulated to a driving record that established that the defendant's
license was revoked at the time of the incident (R. 79 / 51,109).
On July 8, 2004, Officer Ron VanBeekum, of the South Ogden Police
Department was watching traffic at Monroe Blvd. and 4200 South (R. 79 / 66).
This was a residential area, near two schools, and was posted with a speed limit
of 25 mph (R. 79 / 66, 70). The road is also marked with bright yellow school
zone signs on both sides of the roadway (R. 79 / 67).
Shortly after parking, he observed a red vehicle coming at him in a
northbound direction at a high rate of speed. His initial reaction was "my gad
that thing is going fast," (R. 79 / 70). The officer's visual estimate was that the
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vehicle was traveling at a speed of 55 mph, which was later confirmed at 53
mph by a radar unit that he trained on the red car (R. 79/73, 79). The officer
activated his overhead lights, his yellow bar lights and his alternating flashing
headlights and pulled his patrol car out into the northbound lane of travel (R.
79 / 73, 74). As the defendant approached the officer's vehicle, the officer
thought he made eye contact and then appeared to accelerate (R. 79 / 76).
Officer VanBeekum then made a u-turn and began to pursue the vehicle.
He continued to operate the flashing lights, but never turned on his siren (R. 79
/ 77). The defendant traveled through four intersections and then pulled into a
driveway and stopped his car (R. 79/81). The officer pulled his car behind the
defendant's vehicle and upon observing the defendant exiting his car, also got
out and ordered the defendant to stop (R. 79 / 84). The officer observed the
defendant "slows slightly and then continues to walk rapidly like, I give it the
expression that nothing's going on, what's up, you know, I'm innocent type
thing. But he continues to walk toward the house/" (R. 79 / 85).
The officer then grabbed the defendant, pushed him up against the car
and tried to handcuff him. At that point the officer first identified himself as a
police officer (R. 79 / 97). The defendant struggled until the officer threatened
to use pepper spray, at which time the defendant calmed down and the officer
was able to cuff the defendant (R. 79 / 86, 87). The officer finally told the
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defendant he was under arrest after he put on the handcuffs (R. 79 / 90). After
the State rested, the defendant made a motion to dismiss, which was denied by
the trial court (R. 79/110).
Defendant's friend Claudia Icedo testified that on the day in question she
and the defendant had received a phone call that one of the kids had fallen and
they needed to get back to the house in a hurry (R. 79 / 112). They were each
driving a car at approximately 50 mph along Monroe Blvd. when she saw the
officer flip a u-turn in front of her attempting to follow the defendant (R. 79 /
112). She followed the defendant to the house where she observed the officer
arresting the defendant (R. 79 / 113).
Based on the above facts the Defendant was found guilty of all charges.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant acknowledges that the convictions of speeding and
driving on suspension were appropriate. The convictions for Failure to
Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; and Interference
with an Arresting Officer requires that the State prove that the defendant have a
required mens rea of knowledge that the individual attempting the stop or
effectuating the arrest is a peace officer. For the offense of failure to respond to
the command of a peace officer contains the requirement that the individual
know that the person issuing the command is in fact a peace officer. Similarly,
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the offense of interfering with an arresting officer requires the defendant have
"knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that
a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest".
The Defendant was convicted of these two charges even though the
evidence that the State presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the
defendant had the requisite knowledge that the individual was a peace officer.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT
OF FAILING TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A
POLICE OFFICER AND INTERFERING WITH A LEGAL
ARREST.
The Defendant recognizes that in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in a jury verdict, the standard of review is narrow. See, State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443, 444 (Utah 1983).
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences, "from which findings of all the
8

requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.
The Courts power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of
insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 196 (2000).
The Utah Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v.
Mead 21 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated,
"[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury
verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court
may overturn a conviction. Furthermore, UCA §77-17-3 requires a trial court
to discharge a defendant where there is "not sufficient evidence" to support a
conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction of sexual
exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
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possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence,
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the
defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the
Court also stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can
take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 444-445.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah
2002) the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of evidence
tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a
10

second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found,
but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the
motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that
conviction, the Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed
it ever existed. Id. at 100.
In State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that "criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or
probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged . . . " Id.
at 402.
Finally, in the case of State v. Gonzales, 2 P.3d 954 (Utah Ct. App.
2000) this Court reversed the defendant's conviction of tampering with
evidence where the State failed to present any credible evidence, other than
inferences, that the defendant had concealed either a gun or some marijuana
after an official proceeding had commenced.
"We will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the
evidence." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). We simply cannot
11

conclude that the State introduced sufficient evidence to support
all the elements of evidence tampering beyond a reasonable
doubt. (State v. Gonzales at 959)
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an
extensive marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported.
In the case at bar, the evidence that was presented at trial does not meet
the statutory elements of intent or knowledge that the officer was in fact an
officer of the law. Although the defendant recognizes the facts when viewed in
light most favorable to the jury's verdict would clearly indicate the officer had
inactivated his overhead lights and that the defendant had possibly made eye
contact, there is a significant gap between those facts and the establishment of
knowledge that the officer was an officer of the law. This is particularly true
given the circumstances as testified to by Claudia Icedo that the defendant had
moments earlier learned that one of his kids had fallen and had been injured.
The case at bar is very similar to Gonzales, wherein the State was unable to
make any connection between the evidence presented at trial and one of the
critical elements of the offense.

It is undisputed that the defendant was

speeding home to his injured child. It is further undisputed that the defendant
traveled only a few blocks past the officer and immediately pulled into the
driveway quickly attempted to proceed into the home. The totality of the
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evidence should certainly raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable
juror as to whether or not the defendant had noticed that the car was a marked
police car. This is further supported by the fact that the officer admitted he
never activated any siren. Even when the officer testified that upon exiting the
vehicle and ordering the defendant to stop the defendant continued walking
quickly, this action could support both theories of the case. At best, the
evidence "supports only the proposition" (State v. Gonzales infra.) that the
defendant knew that Officer Van Beekum was in fact a police officer.
Given that reasonable doubt, the evidence should be determined to be
insufficient to support a conviction, and the convictions on the evading and the
interfering with arrest should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Both charges in this case, the failure to stop as well as the interfering
with arrest require the state prove that the defendant knew that the individual
involved was a peace officer Although there is no dispute that the defendant
continued driving to his home upon passing the officer with his overhead lights
flashing and did not stop of the officer's command as he left his vehicle, the
element that the defendant knew of the identity of the officer was never proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully

requests this court to reverse his convictions for failure to stop at a command of
police officer and resisting arrest.
DATED this & day of September, 2005/
)ALL W>RICHARDS
Attdrney for Appellant
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I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for thePlaintifO^TEast 300
South 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah/*^4-0180/postag|e prepaid
this J^ day of September, 2005.

)ALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MAR 1 7

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 041903949 FS

MICHAEL SHAKEEL PETERSON,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JOHN R MORRIS
March 14, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
carier
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES RETALLICK
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 27, 1977
Video
Tape Number:
M031405
Tape Count: 1057
CHARGES
1. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty
2. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty
3. DRIVE ON REVOCATION/SUSPENSION/DENIED - Class C Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty
4. SPEEDING - Class C Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in
custody from the Weber County Jail.

Page 1

or.9

Case No: 041903949
Date:
Mar 14, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Each count is to run concurrent with each other.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180
day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVE ON
REVOCATION/SUSPENSION/DENIED a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant
is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of SPEEDING a Class C
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s)
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE

060

Case No: 041903949
Date:
Mar 14, 2005
Jail term may be served at the Utah State Prison.
Dated this

I «~ day of

rwhttti-

, 2o°r .
JOHN R MORRIS
T
District Court Judge

Page 3 (last)
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